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Patients with bilateral hippocampal damage acquired in adulthoodwho are amnesic for past events have
also been reported to be impaired at imagining ﬁctitious and future experiences. One such patient, P01,
however, was found to be unimpaired on these tasks despite dense amnesia and 50% volume loss in both
hippocampi. P01 might be an atypical case, and in order to investigate this we identiﬁed another patient
with a similar neuropsychological proﬁle. Jon is awell-characterisedpatientwithdevelopmental amnesia
and 50% volume loss in his hippocampi. Interestingly both Jon and P01 retain some recognition memory
ability, and showactivation of residual hippocampal tissue during fMRI. Jon’s ability to construct ﬁctitiouscene construction
pisodic memory
uture thinking
ippocampus
utobiographical
MRI
and future scenarios was compared with the adult-acquired cases previously reported on this task and
control participants. In contrast to the adult-acquired cases, but similar to P01, Jon was able to richly
imagine both ﬁctitious and future experiences in a comparablemanner to control participants.Moreover,
his constructions were spatially coherent. We speculate that the hippocampal activation during fMRI
noted previously in P01 and Jon might indicate some residual hippocampal function which is sufﬁcient
d abil
 to support their preserve
. Introduction
The hippocampus is part of a network of brain regions acknowl-
dged to play a role in retrieving autobiographical memories
Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; Maguire, 2001; Spreng, Mar, &
im, 2009; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006) and support-
ng spatial navigation (Bird & Burgess, 2008; Burgess, Maguire,
O’Keefe, 2002). In the last few years, functional MRI (fMRI)
ndings have indicated the hippocampus is also involved in imag-
ning ﬁctitious episodes (Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007;
ummerﬁeld, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2009, 2010), and the simula-
ion of plausible personal future events (e.g. Addis & Schacter,
008; Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Addis, Wong, &
chacter, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; Okuda et
l., 2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007). Further com-
elling evidence for this comes frompatientswith damage thought
o be relatively restricted to the hippocampus bilaterally. Hass-
bis, Kumaran, Vann, and Maguire (2007; see also Klein, Loftus,
Kihlstrom, 2002; Rosenbaum et al., 2005) tested ﬁve patients
ith such damage that was acquired in adulthood, rendering
hem amnesic. They were asked to imagine and describe ﬁcti-
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 20 78337457; fax: +44 20 78131445.
E-mail address: e.maguire@ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk (E.A. Maguire).
028-3932 © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. 
oi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.06.037
Open access under CC BY license. ity to imagine ﬁctitious and future scenarios.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. 
tious scenarios and also possible plausible future episodes. The
patient group was signiﬁcantly impaired relative to control par-
ticipants on both tasks, and a possible source for their deﬁcit was
identiﬁed. Whilst patients were able to produce relevant details
when asked to imagine, their descriptions lacked spatial coher-
ence andwere fragmented. It was concluded that the hippocampus
may play a critical role in imagination by binding together the
disparate elements of an event or scene (Cohen & Eichenbaum,
1993; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007; O’Keefe & Nadel,
1978).
The involvement of the hippocampus (and other brain areas) in
supporting apparently disparate functions such as autobiographi-
cal memory, spatial navigation, imagination, and future thinking,
led Hassabis and Maguire (2007, 2009) to propose that they
were underpinned by a common set of processes which they
described as ‘scene construction’. This involves the mental gen-
eration and maintenance of a complex and coherent scene or
event. This is achieved by the reactivation, retrieval and integra-
tion of relevant semantic, contextual and sensory components,
stored in their modality speciﬁc cortical areas (Wheeler, Petersen,
Open access under CC BY license.& Buckner, 2000), the product of which has a coherent spatial con-
text (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007), and can then later be
manipulated and visualised.
Whilst the ﬁndings of Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al. (2007)
of deﬁcient performance on the imagination task following hip-
3188 E.A. Maguire et al. / Neuropsycho
Fig. 1. FMRI data from adult-acquired case P01 and developmental amnesia patient
Jon. Both data sets were acquired on the same 1.5 TMRI scanner. (A) P01’s right hip-
pocampus was active during the incidental acquisition of facts (data from Hassabis,
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ctive during an autobiographical memory recall task (data from Maguire et al.,
001).
ocampal pathology are supportive of the concept of scene
onstruction, it is notable that one of the ﬁve patients in that study
as unimpaired. P01 (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007; also
nown as KN – Aggleton et al., 2005; McKenna & Gerhand, 2002),
espite being profoundly amnesic for past experiences, was able
o achieve rich scene construction with clear spatial coherence
hat was at the top end of the range of control participants. P01’s
athologywas acquired in adulthood, leaving himwith almost 50%
olume loss in both hippocampi (Aggleton et al., 2005). Hewas also
ery impairedon tests of recall, both for anterogradeepisodicmem-
ry and retrograde memory for autobiographical events, for which
e had virtually no reliable recollections (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann,
t al., 2007). Despite this, his IQ was in the high average range,
nd he performed within normal limits on a number of tests of
ecognition (Aggleton et al., 2005). He also retained some ability
o acquire new semantic information (McKenna & Gerhand, 2002).
MRI scanning revealed that therewas residual BOLD activity in his
ight hippocampus during the incidental (and successful) acquisi-
ion of facts (Fig. 1a; see Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007 –
upplementaryMaterial; see alsoMaguire & Frith, 2004). Hassabis,
umaran, Vann, et al. (2007) speculated that P01mayhave retained
limited degree of residual hippocampal functionality that sup-
orted his performance on the imagination task.logia 48 (2010) 3187–3192
P01 is just one patient who has preserved scene construction
ability, and it is possible that he is atypical, making his relevance
for understanding hippocampal function and the imagination of
future scenarios uncertain. In order to understand more about the
circumstances in which the ability to imagine ﬁctitious and future
scenarios might be preserved in the context of hippocampal dam-
age, in the ﬁrst instance it would be informative to identify other
patients who perform similarly to P01 on such tasks. We noted
that P01 has several features in common with another group of
patients, namely those with developmental amnesia (DA). Patients
with DA, a syndrome caused by relatively selective damage to the
hippocampus following hypoxic-ischaemic episodes sustained in
childhood, are able to acquire normal levels of intelligence and
general knowledge despite a severe impairment in remembering
the events of daily life (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). This disso-
ciation between semantic and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972),
seems to be accompanied by a second dissociation, between rel-
atively preserved recognition ability and a marked impairment in
recall (Adlam,Malloy,Mishkin, & Vargha-Khadem, 2009; Baddeley,
Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2001; Mishkin, Suzuki, Gadian, &
Vargha-Khadem, 1997; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). One partic-
ularly well-characterised patient with DA is Jon (see case summary
below, and e.g. Adlam et al., 2009; Baddeley et al., 2001; Brandt,
Gardiner, Vargha-Khadem, Baddeley, & Mishkin, 2008; de Haan,
Mishkin, Baldeweg, & Vargha-Khadem, 2006; Gadian et al., 2000;
Gardiner, Brandt, Vargha-Khadem, Baddeley, & Mishkin, 2006;
Hartley et al., 2007; Mishkin et al., 1997; Vargha-Khadem et
al., 1997). As well as the primary features of DA noted above,
like P01 with adult-acquired pathology, Jon has ∼50% bilateral
hippocampal volume loss in the face of a high average IQ. Interest-
ingly, Jon appears to have preserved recollection of a small set of
autobiographical events, thatwhen recalledduring fMRIwere asso-
ciated with bilateral activation of his residual hippocampal tissue
(Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 2001; see Fig. 1b).
Given the similarity in proﬁles between developmental case Jon
and adult-acquired case P01, we wondered how Jon would fare
in constructing imagined scenarios. The commonalities between
both cases led us to hypothesise that Jon too might be unim-
paired. In order to examine this, we administered exactly the same
tests of imagining ﬁctitious and future scenarios to Jon as those
undertaken by P01 and the other adult-acquired cases of hip-
pocampal pathology described by Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al.
(2007).
2. Methods
2.1. Case description
Jon, whowas 28 years old at time of testing, is a well-documented case of devel-
opmental amnesia (see above). Brieﬂy, he was born prematurely at 26 weeks of
gestation. He weighed less than 1kg, suffered breathing problems and during his
ﬁrst 6 weeks of life required intubation and positive pressure ventilation for severe
apnea (Gadian et al., 2000). He subsequently showed steady improvement and nor-
mal development, but by the age of ﬁve, memory problems were noted, and have
since continued to be prominent. Direct measurement of Jon’s MRI scans in adult-
hood indicated a reduction of∼50% in the volume of both left and right hippocampal
regions, with no evident pathology in the rest of the medial temporal lobe (Gadian
et al., 2000; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Consistent with his hippocampal abnor-
mality, Jon has difﬁculty in reliably ﬁnding his way. He also tends to forget where
belongings are normally kept, has problems remembering everyday events such as
TV programmes just seen and is typically unable to give a detailed account of his
activities earlier in the day.
On the other hand, he has a full scale IQ of 114 (high average), and performs
normally on tests of reading, syntax, semantics and vocabulary (see Baddeley et
al., 2001). He was able to attend normal school and acquire and retain the nec-range of standardized memory tests, particularly when these involve recall rather
than recognition. His performance onmeasures of recognition is relativelywell pre-
served; he performs at a comparable level to control participants on a number of
tests (Baddeley et al., 2001), or at a slightly lower level on others (Gardiner et al.,
2006).
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.2. Other participants
Jon’s performance was evaluated with respect to data from a previous study
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007), where exactly the same task and procedures
ere employed. In that study, ﬁve patients with amnesia took part (all male) each
ith primary damage to the hippocampi bilaterally that was acquired in adulthood.
ull details of each patient are provided in Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al. (2007).
rieﬂy, the mean age of the patients was 52.8 years (SD 18.5, range 24–70), years of
ducation 14.0 years (SD 3.7, range 11–19) and verbal IQ was 103.2 (SD 11.7, range
0–116). All of the patients had signiﬁcant impairment of anterograde memory,
ome deﬁcient on both recognition and recall tests, others on recall tests alone.
etrieval of pre-morbid semantic memory was intact in all cases, whilst retrograde
emory for episodic experiences was impaired, with the amnesic period ranging
rom 10 years to a complete lifetime. Lesions were conﬁrmed by structural MRI
cans, and appeared to implicate the hippocampi, with no evidence of damage in
djacent medial temporal areas.
Besides the basic proﬁle of hippocampal amnesia shared by Jon and the adult-
cquired cases, P01 had additional features in common with Jon. As noted in the
ntroduction, P01, aged 46 at the time of testing, has been described in detail
lsewhere (Aggleton et al., 2005; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis,
umaran, Vann, et al., 2007; McKenna & Gerhand, 2002). To summarise, this for-
er industrial biochemist contracted meningeo-encephalitis at the age of 34 and
hen recurrent meningitis. He was left without useful motor function below T12,
nd amnesia. As with Jon, P01’s IQ was in the high average range (113 at the time
f this study, as measured by the WTAR, Wechsler, 2001); the volume loss in both
is hippocampi was nearly 50%; and he also retained some ability to acquire new
emantic information. P01 performednormally on tests of language, executive func-
ion, and perception. His anterograde memory for episodic information was grossly
mpaired. He performed within normal limits on some tests of recognition, but was
ery impaired on tests of recall. His retrogradememory for autobiographical events
as grossly impaired across four decades.
Ten healthy control participants also took part (all male) in Hassabis, Kumaran,
ann, et al. (2007). Themean age of the control participantswas 52.2 years (SD 16.9,
ange 25–76), years of education was 14.1 years (SD 2.8, range 11–17), and verbal
Q was 104.3 (SD 6.3, range 94–112). There was no signiﬁcant difference between
he patients with adult-acquired hippocampal damage and the control participants
n these background characteristics (age p=0.95; education p=0.95; IQ p=0.81).
ach patient had two control participants who were matched to them on age and
Q. Of note, two of these control participants also matched Jon. All participants gave
nformed written consent to participation in the study in accordance with local
esearch ethics committees.
.3. Task and procedure
A full description of the task and scoring is provided inHassabis, Kumaran, Vann,
t al. (2007). Brieﬂy, each participant was tested individually. The session was dig-
tally recorded to enable transcription and later scoring of participants’ responses.
he requirements of the taskwereexplained, and several examplesprovided.During
his practice phase we also established that patients could remember the instruc-
ions and the cues throughout a construction trial. Commonplace ordinary settings
erechosenas scenarios tominimise thedifﬁculty level, andbeas independent from
participant’s innate creative ability as possible. The scenarios purposely encom-
assed a variety of different subject matter from the man-made to the natural, and
he busy to the isolated to ensure there were no content biases. Each participant
ompleted 10 trials, 7 involving ﬁctitious scenarios (a beach, museum, pub, port,
arket, forest, and castle setting). In three additional trials we also examined the
ffect of scenarios that were explicitly self-relevant and potentially plausible in the
uture (possible Christmas event, possible event over next weekend, possible future
eeting with a friend).
For each scenario a short description was read out loud by the interviewer from
prepared script (e.g. ‘Imagine you’re lying on a white sandy beach in a beautiful
ropical bay’) and the participant was instructed to vividly imagine the situation
uggested by the cue and describe it in as much (multi-modal) detail as possible.
articipants were explicitly told not to recount an actual memory or any part of one
ut rather create something new. A printed text cardwas placed on the desk in front
f the participant summarising themain concept of the scenario to act as a reminder
f needed. Participants were allowed to continue with their descriptions until they
ame to a natural end or they felt nothing else could be added. A probing protocol
ictated the appropriate use of statements used by the examiner during the session.
hese mostly took the form of general probes encouraging further description (e.g.
canyouseeanythingelse in the scene?’), or asking for furtherelaborationona theme
ntroduced by the participant (e.g. ‘can you describe the ﬁshing boat inmore detail?’
n response to the participant saying ‘I can see a small ﬁshing boat gently rocking out
n the sea’). Itwas strictly prohibited for the examiner to introduce any concept, idea,
etail or entity that had not already previously been mentioned by the participant.
fter each scenario, participants were asked to rate their constructions on a number
f different parameters (see Section 2.4). At various points during a trial, and prior
o the post-scenario ratings, the examiner veriﬁed that the participant still recalled
he task instructions, the scenario in question, and the scenario he had created.ogia 48 (2010) 3187–3192 3189
2.4. Scoring
A composite score, the Experiential Index, ranging from 0 to 60, measuring
the overall richness of the imagined experience, was calculated from four sub-
components.
Content: Each scenario description was segmented into a set of statements.
Every statement was then classiﬁed as belonging to one of the fourmain categories:
spatial reference, entity presence, sensory description, or thought/emotion/action.
Repeated statements, irrelevant details and other tangential information that could
not be classiﬁed into one of these four categories were discarded. Extensive pilot
studies indicated that the production of seven details per category was an optimal
reﬂection of performance whilst ensuring that those with more circuitous descrip-
tions were not unfairly advantaged. Thus, the score for each details category was
capped at a maximum of 7.
Participant ratings: Two subjective self-ratings contributed to the Experiential
Index, each varying on a scale from 1 to 5: sense of presence (1 – ‘did not feel like I
was there at all’; 5 – ‘felt strongly like I was really there’) and perceived salience (1
– ‘couldn’t really see anything’; 5 – ‘extremely salient’).
Spatial Coherence Index: As part of the feedback on each scenario participants
were presented with a set of 12 statements each providing a possible qualitative
description of the newly constructed experience. Participants were instructed to
indicate the statements they felt accurately described their construction. Theywere
free to identify asmany or as few as they thought appropriate. Of the 12 statements,
8 were ‘integrated’ and indicated that aspects of the scene were contiguous (e.g. ‘I
could see thewhole scene inmymind’s eye’) and 4were ‘fragmented’ and indicated
that aspects of the scene were not contiguous (e.g. ‘It was a collection of separate
images’). One point was awarded for each integrated statement selected and one
point taken away for each fragmented statement. This yielded a score between −4
and +8 that was then normalised around zero to give ﬁnal Spatial Coherence Index
score ranging between −6 (totally fragmented) and +6 (completely integrated).
Any construction with a negative Spatial Coherence Index was considered to be
incoherent and fragmented
Quality judgement: The ﬁnal scoring component was the scorer’s assessment of
the overall quality of the construction. Scorerswere instructed to rate howwell they
felt the description evoked a detailed ‘picture’ of the experience in their ownmind’s
eye. Quality ratings could range from 0 (indicating the construction was completely
devoid of details and with no sense of experiencing) to 10 (indicating an extremely
rich and highly evocative construction that appeared to emerge from an extremely
vivid imagining).
Several other ratings were also taken. After imagining each new experience,
participants rated how difﬁcult they found this on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 – very easy,
. . ., 5 – very difﬁcult). They were also asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 its similarity
to an actual memory, in whole or in part (1 – nothing at all like any memories, . . .,
5 – exactly like a memory).
2.5. Data analysis
Ourmain interest was in comparing DA patient Jon with the group of 10 control
participants. In order to do this we used a modiﬁed t-test (Crawford & Garthwaite,
2002; Crawford & Howell, 1998). This test treats an individual patient as a sample,
affording the comparison of the patient and a reasonably small control group. All
results are two-tailed with a signiﬁcance threshold of p<0.05.
3. Results
To provide a context for interpreting Jon’s performance, we ﬁrst
provide a short summary of the ﬁndings from Hassabis, Kumaran,
Vann, et al. (2007), where the group of 5 patients with adult-
acquired hippocampal damage were compared to the 10 control
participants (see Table 1, and Figs. 2 and 3). The patient group
scored signiﬁcantly lower on the overall Experiential Index than
the control group, thus revealing that the ability to richly imag-
ine new experiences is compromised in the context of bilateral
hippocampal damage. Signiﬁcant impairment was noted for the
patients across all types of content (spatial references, entities
present, sensory descriptions, thoughts/emotions/actions), and in
the overall quality judgement. Interestingly, there was no differ-
ence between patients and controls in terms of perceived difﬁculty
of the task, perceived sense of presence and perceived salience of
the imagined scenarios, or in the degree of similarity to real mem-
ories. Of particular note were the scores on the Spatial Coherence
Index, a measure of the contiguousness and spatial integrity of
the imagined scene. Compared with controls, feedback from the
patients indicated that their imagined experiences were fragmen-
tary and lacking in coherence. Finally, whilst overall the patient
3190 E.A. Maguire et al. / Neuropsychologia 48 (2010) 3187–3192
Fig. 2. Scores on the Experiential Index. Data for each adult-acquired case of hip-
pocampal damage and every control participant are represented by black dots (data
fromHassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007); the data point for P01 is noted. Vertical
bars signify group means of the adult-acquired patients and the controls. The data
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Fig. 3. Scores on the Spatial Coherence Index. Data for each adult-acquired case of
hippocampal damage and every control participant are represented by black dots
(data from Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007); the data point for P01 is noted.
performed comparably to controls on measures of content–spatial
T
Point for developmental amnesia patient Jon is represented by a red star. (For inter-
retation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to
he web version of this article.)
roupwas impaired at imagining new experiences, examination of
igs. 2 and 3 shows that one of the patients (P01) was unimpaired
n the task.
Jon’s scores are also reported Table 1. Performances on the two
cenario types (ﬁctitiousandpersonalplausible futureevents)were
nitially analysed separately. However, both had identical patterns
f results, and so for clarity we present the results collapsed across
cenarios. There was no signiﬁcant difference between Jon and the
ontrol participants on the overall Experiential Index (t(9) −0.54,
= 0.61). Fig. 2 shows that his score was in the mid-range of the
able 1
erformance on the imagination task.
Adult-acquired amnesia (n=5)a
Overall richness
Experiential Index 27.54 (13.12)
Sub-components
Content
Spatial references 2.38 (1.82)
Entities present 4.94 (1.26)
Sensory descriptions 4.12 (1.03)
Thoughts/emotions/actions 2.76 (1.77)
Participant ratings
Sense of presence 3.46 (1.15)
Perceived salience 3.52 (1.19)
Spatial coherence
Spatial Coherence Index 0.10 (3.21)
Scorer rating
Quality judgement 3.88 (2.70)
Other ratings
Task difﬁculty 2.20 (1.07)
Similarity to real memories 2.37 (0.90)
a Data from Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al. (2007).Vertical bars signify group means of the adult-acquired patients and the controls.
The data point for developmental amnesia patient Jon is represented by a red star.
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)
controls, and clearly signiﬁcantly better than the patients with
adult-acquired hippocampal damage (excluding P01). Similarly, hereferences (t(9) 0.02, p=0.99), entities present (t(9) −0.43, p=0.68)
and thoughts/emotions/actions (t(9) 0.92, p=0.38). Interestingly,
his score for sensory descriptions was borderline impaired (t(9)
−2.172, p=0.058), and this is the only content score on which
Mean (SD)Jon Controls (n=10)a
42.80 45.06 (4.02)
5.30 5.28 (1.15)
6.30 6.49 (0.42)
4.00 5.64 (0.72)
4.90 5.52 (0.64)
4.20 3.65 (0.49)
4.30 3.88 (0.48)
3.10 3.68 (1.30)
7.00 7.13 (0.96)
1.60 2.13 (0.64)
2.00 2.03 (0.62)
E.A. Maguire et al. / Neuropsychol
Fig. 4. Examplesof imagined scenarios. Representative excerpts fromtranscriptions
relating to one of the scenarios, with the cue at the top. An excerpt from P03, an
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Bdult-acquired case of a similar age and IQ to Jon, is shown on top, followed by Jon’s
onstruction of the same scenario, followedby that of a control participant similar to
oth patients on age and IQ. Interviewer’s probing comments are in italics. Relevant
ackground information is noted in square brackets.
on and the adult-acquired damage patients performed similarly
Jon’s mean: 4.00, patient group mean: 4.12). Jon’s overall qual-
ty judgement score was unimpaired (t(9) −0.13, p=0.90). As with
he patient group, there was no difference between Jon’s rat-
ngs and those of control participants for sense of presence (t(9)
.07, p=0.31), perceived salience (t(9) 0.46, p=0.67), task difﬁculty
t(9) −0.79, p=0.45), and similarity to real memories (t(9) −0.05,
= 0.96). His score on the Spatial Coherence Index was also indis-
inguishable from controls (t(9) −0.43, p=0.68, see Fig. 3).
Considering the two control participants that were matched to
on in terms of age and IQ, Experiential Index scores were simi-
ar (Jon’s mean: 42.80, mean of the two controls: 47.83, SD 5.44),
s was the Spatial Coherence Index (Jon’s mean: 3.10, mean of
he two controls: 3.75, SD 0.63). By contrast, a patient with adult-
cquired hippocampal damage who was similar in age and IQ to
on (P03), was severely impaired on the Experiential (20.30) and
patial Coherence (−1.30) Indices, showing that merely having a
igh IQ is not sufﬁcient to mitigate poor performance on the con-
truction task. Fig. 4 depicts excerpts from P03, Jon and a matched
ontrol participant on one of the scenarios. Interestingly, Jon’s per-
ormance on the construction task is broadly consistentwith that of
he adult-acquired case P01, who scored normally on all measures,
ncluding sensory details (P01’s mean for this was 5.30).
After testing was complete, Jon was asked about his experience
f doing the task. He observed: “I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to visualise things
n my mind’s eye. When I do try, I can do it. It doesn’t come auto-
atically, though. I know it probably does with most people. It’s
ot something I used to be able to do, but I’ve worked on it a lot
ver the years.” He notes that routinely, on a day-to-day basis, he
enerally does not create scenes, but only does so if there “is no
ther way to deal with the situation”. He does not instantly picture
scene, he has to work at it. “It doesn’t come at the snap of a ﬁnger,
ike it does with other people, I have a starting point and then ﬁll in
he details.”When asked if he was a ‘visual’ person, he laughed and
aid “deﬁnitely not; I’m the complete opposite of a visual person”.
y contrast, when P01 was asked the same questions about howogia 48 (2010) 3187–3192 3191
he was able to conjure up imaginary scenes and scenarios, he said
“when asked to imagine a scene, it comes in one shot, in an instant,
it’s automatic, it comes very easily. It feels like a real space, and I can
explore it, move around and all the detail is there forme to see”. He
added that he can easily imagine events or experiences that other
people describe to him, and regards himself as a very visual person.
4. Discussion
The aim of this study was to assess whether Jon, a patient
with bilateral hippocampal damage and developmental amnesia,
was able to imagine ﬁctitious and future experiences. In line with
our hypothesis, we found that this most well-characterised of DA
patients, was indeed able to richly imagine both types of scenario
in a comparable manner to control participants, and that his con-
structions were spatially coherent. This stands in marked contrast
to four of the ﬁve patients with adult-acquired hippocampal dam-
age tested byHassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al. (2007),whowere very
signiﬁcantly impaired on the same imagination task. Notably, Jon’s
performancewas similar toP01, theonly adult-acquired case tested
by Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al. (2007) who was unimpaired on
the task.
Jon’s preserved scene construction ability shows that P01 was
not an isolated and atypical case, and that some conﬂuence of fac-
tors can arise that leads to preserved scene construction in the
context of hippocampal amnesia. What might that be? Both Jon
and P01 have high average IQ’s, activation of their residual hip-
pocampal tissue on fMRI despite similar hippocampal volume loss
of ∼50% bilaterally, preserved performance on a number of recog-
nition memory tests, and a similar pattern of performance on a
weather prediction task (Kumaran et al., 2007). The relationship
between these features, and possible causes and effects are dif-
ﬁcult to determine. For instance, it may be that their semantic
knowledge in some way boosts performance on scene construc-
tion tests. The relationship between semantic knowledge and the
elements that comprise a constructed scenario/simulation remains
to be determined, however (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009; Schacter &
Addis, 2009; Summerﬁeld et al., 2010; Szpunar, 2010). Moreover,
the basis of Jon’s (and the other DA cases) semantic knowledge
acquisition is still essentially unknown.
It could also be the case that activity in their residual hippocam-
pal tissue supports the ability to imagine new scenarios, and that
this is the key feature. Residual hippocampal tissue was active in
both patients (bilaterally in Jon, right hippocampus in P01) and in
similar circumstances to control participants during autobiograph-
ical memory retrieval in Jon and semantic learning in P01. Whilst
we cannot deﬁnitely relate function to these hippocampal activa-
tions, we suggest the activations might indicate some preserved
hippocampal function which is also sufﬁcient to support their pre-
served ability to imagine scenarios. Clearly, it will be important in
the future to examine Jon and P01 and any similar cases that are
reported, with fMRI whilst they construct imagined scenes or sce-
narios in order to verify that the hippocampus is indeed activated.
Moreover, it will be of interest to know if the other brain areas
that activate in control participants during imagination/simulation
(Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Spreng et
al., 2009) are also activated in such patients.
It is also important to bear inmind that just because P01 and Jon
are both preserved at scene construction, does not imply that the
underlying mechanisms are the same in both cases. The feedback
provided by both patients during the debrieﬁng session suggests
they might have employed different strategies. P01’s description
of how he imagined ﬁctitious scenarios resonates with that of con-
trol participants, in that it was automatic and a scene ‘appeared’
in an instant in his imagination. Jon, by contrast, had to work at
visualising scenes, it was an effortful process. This may suggest a
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ompensatory strategy that he actively engaged during the imagi-
ation task. Interestingly, the one sub-measure thatwas borderline
mpaired in Jon, and on which he scored comparably with the
mpaired adult-acquired cases, was sensory descriptions. This con-
ent category consisted of statements describing (in any modality)
ropertiesof anentity (e.g. ‘thechair I’msittingon ismadeofwood’)
s well as general weather and atmosphere descriptions (e.g. ‘it is
ery hot’ or ‘the room is very smoky’). His poorer performance on
hismeasuremay betray the effortful nature of his visualising, with
he ﬁne details eluding his compensatory strategy (Moscovitch et
l., 2005; see also Bird, Vargha-Khadem, & Burgess, 2008; Kumaran
t al., 2007). P01, by comparison,was similar to control participants
n this measure.
Overall, these factors further underscore the need to perform
MRIwith these and other patients whose scene construction abili-
ies are similarlypreservedas theymayengagedifferentbrainareas
r there may be altered inter-regional connectivity (Maguire et al.,
001) depending on their strategies. Furthermore, Jon is just one
xample of a patient with developmental amnesia, albeit the most
omprehensively tested, and we can now add preserved ability
o construct imagined scenarios to his neuropsychological proﬁle.
owever, this may not apply to other DA cases (e.g. see Kwan,
arson, Addis, & Rosenbaum, in press) and it will be important
o test more of these patients in order to establish if intact scene
onstruction is a robust signature of the developmental amnesia
yndrome.
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